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PATRICIA E. SALKIN and
MARGARET LAVERY*
Irresponsible Legislating:
Reeling in the Aftermath
of Kelo
I. Introduction
The U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision last term in Kelo v.
City of New London continues
to attract unusual media atten-
tion and has captured the emo-
tion of many Americans be-
cause the case reminded
people, with an example that
hit close to home, literally, the
powers enjoyed by federal,
state and local governments
pursuant to the Fifth Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution.1
This media frenzy has caused,
in many instances, an unfortu-
nate hysteria based largely on
misunderstandings of law and
fact. Congress, as well as state
legislatures across the United
States, has been quick to intro-
duce a wide range of legislative
*Patricia E. Salkin is Associate Dean and Director of the Government Law
Center of Albany Law School. She serves as Chair of the Amicus Curiae Com-
mittee of the American Planning Association (APA), and APA submitted a
brief in the Kelo case on behalf of the City of New London. Salkin is co-editor
of Zoning and Planning Law Report, and author of the 3-volume New York
Zoning Law & Practice, 4th ed. Margaret Lavery is a second year student at
Albany Law School and a research assistant at the Government Law Center.
1Well before the headlines and newscasts alerted the public to the Court’s
decision in late June 2005, there was considerable interest by public, private
and non-prot advocates with varying points of view as to how the Justices
might interpret the Public Use Clause of the Constitution. Fifty years after
Berman v. Parker and more than twenty years after Hawaii Housing Authority
v Midki this was the rst opportunity for the Justices to decide whether to
retain a rather expansive notion of ‘‘public use,’’ deferring to the interpreta-
tions given by state and local governments, or to strike a new course in eminent
domain jurisprudence. As a result, this case attracted an unusually high number
of amicus curiae, or ‘‘friend of the court’’ briefs. In fact, between November
2004 and January 2005, thirty-seven amicus curiae briefs were led in the
U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Kelo v. City of New London, twenty-ve in
support of Petitioner and twelve in support of Respondent. In total, more than
100 organizations signed onto these thirty-seven briefs, with approximately
25 the briefs submitted in support of the City and 12 submitted in support of
the property owners. See Salkin, Lucero and Phillips, ‘‘The Friends of the
Court: The Role of Amicus Curiae in Kelo v City of New London,’’ in Eminent
Domain Use and Abuse: Kelo in Context (forthcoming, ABA Press 2006).
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approaches to, in essence, ei-
ther overturn or severely curtail
the eect of the holding by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Kelo.2
Lawmakers in more than half
of the states have introduced
more than 100 bills oering
various responses to the use of
eminent domain.3 In addition,
Missouri Governor Matt Blunt
introduced an executive order
creating a task force to study
the subject.4
While lawmakers are quick
to act in an attempt to grab
headlines, more thoughtful
consideration must be given to
the short-term and long-term
eects of the various legislative
proposals awaiting, in some
cases, certain action. A number
of the legislative proposals dis-
cussed below would have
broad-sweeping and devastat-
ing eects on the traditional
power of state and local gov-
ernments to exercise eminent
domain to serve a variety of le-
gitimate public purpose goals.
This is not to suggest, how-
ever, that even pre-Kelo, emi-
nent domain laws in various
states have been ripe for re-
examination, not for authority
– as suggested by critics of the
Kelo decision – but for process
or procedural aspects. For ex-
ample, notice provisions for
property owners, statute of lim-
itations for appeals, alternate
methods of determining just
compensation, public partici-
pation and dening blight are
just some areas where careful
study and thoughtful consider-
ation could yield positive
changes in some jurisdictions.
II. Congressional Action
Following Kelo
While it is not unusual from
time to time for Congress or the
President to react to decisions
from the U.S. Supreme Court,
it seems as though the Kelo de-
cision has spurred more imme-
diate legislative proposals than
2The Castle Coalition of the Institute for Justice posts the federal proposals
with status reports at http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/federal/
index.asp (site visited November 2005).
3Legislative proposals that have been introduced to date are linked at Dean
Salkin’s land use law website at http://www2.als.edu/faculty/psalkin/lul–
eminent.html (site visited November 2005).
4Executive Order 05-15 (Missouri Task Force on Eminent Domain),
Governor Matt Blunt, State of Missouri (June 28, 2005) available at: http://
www.mo.gov/mo/eminentdomain/execorder.htm (site visited November
2005).
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The United States Supreme
Court handed down its decision
in Kelo v. City of New London
on June 23, 2005.6 By the next
day, Georgia Representative
Phil Gingrey (R-GA) and 78
co-sponsors submitted House
Resolution 340 condemning
the decision.7 The resolution
‘‘disagrees with the majority
opinion in Kelo . . . and its
holdings that eectively negate
the public use requirement of
the takings clause; and agrees
with the dissenting opinion
. . . in its upholding of the
historical interpretation of the
takings clause and its deference
to the rights of individuals and
their property.’’8 While not
proposing any specic steps to
be taken, this resolution states
the sense of the House of Rep-
resentatives ‘‘that Congress
maintains the prerogative and
reserves the right to address
through legislation any abuses
of eminent domain by State and
local government . . . .’’9 Rep.
Gingrey stated that the Su-
preme Court had ‘‘placed a for-
sale sign on the doorstep of
every American home or
business.’’10 The bills passed
the House of Representatives
on June 30, 2005 by a vote of
365 to 33.11
Just a few weeks later,12 Rep-
resentative Robert Aderholt
(R-AL) introduced House Joint
Resolution 60 proposing to
amend the United States
Constitution.13 The proposed
amendment would read, ‘‘Nei-
ther a State nor the United
States may take private prop-
5For example, President Ronald Reagan issued an Executive Order (Exec.
Order No. 12630) in 1988 following a trilogy of land use decisions addressing
regulatory takings. See 53 FR 8859, 1998 WL 311191 (Pres.). For a historical
summary of bills in Congress on takings, see http://www.law.georgetown.edu/
gelpi/takings/congress/index.htm (site visited November 2005).
6125 S. Ct. 2655 (June 23, 2005).
7H.R. Res. 340 IH, 109th Cong. (2005).
8H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted).
9Id.





13H.J. Res. 60, 109th Cong. (2005).
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erty for the purpose of transfer-
ring possession of, or control
over, that property to another
private person, except for a
public conveyance or transpor-
tation project.’’ The resolution
was referred to the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary in July,
and to date there has been no
further action.
B. Legislative Proposals
A number of legislative pro-
posals in both the House and
Senate have been introduced in
an eort to curtail the ability of
state and local governments to
exercise the power of eminent
domain. The proposals can be
organized into two major cate-
gories: those that would pro-
hibit outright the use of emi-
nent domain for economic
development purposes; and
those that would restrict the use
of federal funds for projects
that involve the use of eminent
domain.
a. Prohibiting Eminent Do-
main for Economic Develop-
ment
The ‘‘Protection of Homes,
Small Businesses, and Private
Property Act of 2005’’ was in-
troduced in the Senate by Sen.
John Cornyn (R-TX) and 30
co-sponsors less than a week
after the Kelo decision.14 It pro-
poses that the term ‘‘public
use’’ in the Fifth Amendment
should not be construed to in-
clude economic development.15
The bill was referred to the
Senate Judiciary Committee
and was the subject of a Com-
mittee hearing on September
20, 2005.16
In the House of Representa-
tives, two similar bills have
been introduced to ‘‘[p]rotect
homes, small businesses, and
other private property rights,
by limiting the power of emi-
nent domain.’’17 Like the Sen-
ate, the House Judiciary Com-
mittee held oversight hearings
in September focusing on emi-
nent domain.18
Introduced by Rep. Frank
Pallone (D-NJ) in October
2005, the ‘‘Protect Our Homes
14S. 1313, 109th Cong. (2005).
15Id.
16See http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id}1612 (site visited
November 2005). The testimony from the hearing is posted to this Committee
website.
17See H.R. 3083 (Rep. Dennis Rehberg) and H.R. 3087 (Rep. Phil Gingrey),
109th Cong. (2005). Both bills have been referred to the House Judiciary
Committee.
18See http://judiciary.house.gov/Oversight.aspx?ID}190 (site visited
November 2005).
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Act’’19 provides that no govern-
mental entity ‘‘may use the
power of eminent domain to
take private property for eco-
nomic development pur-
poses,’’ with an exception for
property that the government
has demonstrated is a ‘‘signi-
cant public health or safety
risk.’’20 Furthermore, the bill
requires that even blighted
property cannot be taken unless
there is no reasonable alterna-
tive, all condemned residential
property is replaced by equally
aordable housing, and the en-
tity has provided just
compensation.21
b. Legislation Restricting
the Use of Federal Funds for
Projects that Use Eminent
Domain
The majority of the federal
bills proposed that advocate
limiting the power of eminent
domain do so by restricting the
use of federal funds where proj-
ects involve the use of
condemnation. This is a power-
ful legislative tactic that would
wreck havoc on many state and
local redevelopment projects
that are dependent upon fund-
ing through a variety of federal
programs.
For example, the ‘‘Private
Property Protection Act of
2005,’’ introduced by Senator
Byron Dorgan (D-ND) on Sep-
tember 14, 200522 was intended
to prevent the use of federal
funds for eminent domain-
assisted economic develop-
ment projects and to essentially
‘‘cut o the spigot of Federal
dollars to these questionable
projects . . . [which] would
have the practical eect of
sharply curtailing this
practice.’’23 This bill prohibits
federal funding for property
subject to a taking by eminent
domain, except where the prop-
erty is for a ‘‘public use or pub-
lic project’’ but species that
economic development is not
to be considered a public use.24
House Bill 3405, the
‘‘Strengthening the Ownership
of Private Property Act of
19H.R. 4088, 109th Cong. (2005).
20Id.
21Id.
22S. 1704, 109th Cong. (2005). This bill is currently in the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
23151 Cong. Rec. S10046 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Dorgan).
24S. 1704 (‘‘Public Use or Public Purpose – Economic development, includ-
ing an increase in the tax base, tax revenues, or employment, may not be the
primary basis for establishing a public use or purpose . . . ’’).
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2005’’ or ‘‘STOPP Act,’’ intro-
duced by Rep. Henry Bonilla
(R-TX) would deny federal
economic development assis-
tance to any state or locality
that uses eminent domain to
obtain property for private
commercial development or
fails to pay for the relocation of
people displaced by viable emi-
nent domain use. With 112 co-
sponsors, the bill was reported
from the Committee on Agri-
culture25 and placed on the
Union Calendar in November
2005.
The ‘‘Private Property
Rights Protection Act of 2005’’
was introduced by Rep.
Sensenbrenner (R-WI) with
136 co-sponsors in June 200526
and with 97 co-sponsors when
an even stronger version was
introduced in November
2005.27 The bill provides that
no state or political subdivision
may exercise the power of emi-
nent domain for economic de-
velopment purposes ‘‘if that
State or political subdivision
receives Federal economic de-
velopment funds during any
scal year in which it does
so.’’28 Additionally, this bill
provides consequences for
noncompliance. A violation by
a state or political subdivision
will not only make it ineligible
for funding on the violating
project but also will make it in-
eligible for federal economic
development funds for the next
two scal years. In a bipartisan
show of support, the bill passed
the house on November 3, 2005
by a vote of 376-38, and it now
rests with the Senate.29 During
the oor debate in the House,
ten amendments were oered
25See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&dbname}cp109
&sid}cp109f1cFY&refer}&r–n}hr261p1.109&item}&sel}TOC–0&
(site visited November 2005).
26H.R. 3135, 109th Cong. (2005).
27H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005).
28Id. The bill denes ‘‘economic development’’ as the taking of private
property without permission of the owner and using the land for private, for-
prot projects or those intended to raise tax revenue, increase tax base, create
jobs or for economic health. The bill creates exemptions where eminent
domain is used to transfer property to a ‘‘common carrier’’ such as railroads,
public facilities or use as a right of way, public utilities, aqueducts or pipelines,
roads, schools and military bases.
29See Julie Ufner, ‘‘House trims eminent domain powers in response to
Kelo case,’’ County News, Vol. 37 No. 21 (Nov. 14, 2005) p. 1, col. 1. (Rep.
Maxine Waters, a co-sponsor of the legislation, said, ‘‘Local governments
cannot be trusted. ‘Many of them are lying with these developers. They have
relationships. Money is changing hands. They are in bed with them.’ ’’)
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to the bill, with six passing by
voice vote providing for,
among other things, clarica-
tion that ‘‘economic develop-
ment’’ does not include the re-
development of browneld
sites or areas that have not been
developed because of pollution
or perceived pollution; clari-
cation that governments have
the burden of proof to show
that the eminent domain is not
for economic development; a
prohibition on the exercise of
eminent domain for property
owned by religious organiza-
tions or other nonprot agen-
cies because of their nonprot
or tax-exempt status; and a
statement of intent that govern-
ment should not attempt to take
land from Hurricane Katrina
survivors for economic devel-
opment purposes.30
House Bill 3058 is the ap-
propriations bill for Treasury,
Transportation, and Housing
and Urban Development, the
Judiciary, District of Columbia
and independent agencies.
With specic reference to emi-
nent domain, the bill provides
that ‘‘[n]one of the funds made
available in this Act may be
used to enforce the judgment of
the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Kelo v.
New London.’’31 This bill is
awaiting Senate consideration.
House Bill 3315 would also
amend an existing funding pro-
cedure to exclude the use of
eminent domain by amending
Title I of the Housing and
Community Development Act
of 1974 to withhold community
development block grant funds
from states and political subdi-
visions ‘‘that do not prohibit
the use of the power of eminent
domain that involves the taking
of the property from private
persons for commercial or eco-
nomic development purposes
and transfer of the property to
other private persons.’’32
These two amending bills
eliminate discreet funding
sources for local-level eco-
nomic redevelopment, but this
approach may seem moderate
when viewed in light of the
‘‘Eminent Domain Limitation
Act.’’33 This bill proposes a
withdrawal of federal funds
that hinges not on a specic
type project, but rather on a
state’s eminent domain statute.
30Id.
31See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.3058: (site visited
November 2005).
32See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.3315: (site visited
November 2005).
33H.R. 3631, 109th Cong. (2005).
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It proposes, ‘‘No State shall be
eligible to receive any Federal
assistance for any economic
development unless that State
has in eect a law relating to
takings meeting [specied]
criteria.’’ These criteria require
that the state’s law relating to
takings must limit the use of
eminent domain to only tradi-
tional public works and public
health and safety, and that even
for those purposes, there must




Property Owners With En-
hanced Rights Act of 2005,’’ or
the ‘‘EMPOWER Act,’’ was
introduced by Senators Orrin
Hatch (R-UT) and Max Baucus
(D-MT) on October 18, 2005.35
Modeled after Utah’s property
rights system, it creates a pro-
gram to support the rights of
private property and business
owners aected by federal pro-
grams by establishing a ‘‘prop-
erty rights ombudsperson’’ au-
thorized to advise citizens
whose property rights may be
aected by a federal action and






As noted in the introduction,
in the months since the Kelo
decision over one hundred
pieces of legislation have been
proposed and/or passed by leg-
islatures in more than half of
the states. These proposals, like
those advanced by Congress,
take the form of proposed
[state] constitutional amend-
ments, resolutions condemning
the Supreme Court ruling, and




Legislation in at least ve
states merely expresses disap-
proval of the Supreme Court’s
decision or a general legislative
intent to rectify the situation.
The language used in these bills
and resolutions demonstrates
the level of emotion and fear
arising from the perceived con-
sequences of the Kelo decision.
For example, Alabama’s
House Resolution 49A com-
pares and contrasts the opinion
in Kelo with the history of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, ‘‘expressing
grave disapproval’’ of the ma-
34Id. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.3631.IH: (site
visited November 2005).
35S. 1883, 109th Cong. (2005).
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jority opinion.36 The bill asserts
that the Takings Clause has
historically only been applied
by the Supreme Court ‘‘condi-
tioned upon the necessity that
[the use of] eminent domain
must be for the public use and
requires just compensation.’’37
Since it is this language that is
the essence of the debate sur-
rounding the Kelo decision, it
is unclear what interpretation
of the Takings Clause this bill
is seeking. This bill does, how-
ever, take the comparatively
moderate position that the tak-
ing of one person’s property for
the ‘‘sole benet’’ of another is
constitutionally unjustiable.
Kentucky’s preled Concur-
rent Resolution 134 urges the
United States Congress to pass
a constitutional amendment
‘‘to protect the rights and secu-
rity of citizens in their private
property from government tak-
ings for the promotion of pri-
vate development.’’38 Prevent-
ing even the ‘‘promotion’’ of
private development closes the
door on any variety of eminent
domain use other than govern-
ment owned public works. The
drafters of this bill did not con-
test the Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of ‘‘public use’’ in
the Takings Clause but claimed
that the Kelo decision eec-
tively deleted the requirement
entirely. Rhode Island’s Senate
Resolution 123739 also asserts
that the Supreme Court erred in
its interpretation of ‘‘public
use.’’ This bill states that the
Kelo decision ‘‘favors rich cor-
poration’s commercial devel-
opment for prot at the expense
of family and privately owned
property rights.’’40
Two states have declared a
general disagreement with the
Kelo decision and a legislative
intent to revise their own emi-
36H.R. 49A, 2005 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005); also H.J.R. 54, 2005
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2005). This bill uses some of the most sweeping
language of any legislation in this category, including declaring private owner-
ship of property to be an ‘‘essential element of a free, independent, and
sovereign society.’’
37H.R. 49A, 2005 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005).
38B.R. 134, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005) (preled).
39See also H.R. 6636, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2005).
40S.R. 1237, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2005). The majority
opinion in Kelo admitted that ‘‘the government’s pursuit of a public purpose
will often benet individual private parties’’ but insisted that in this case, there
was no ‘‘suspicion that a private purpose was afoot.’’ The court therefore, as
opposed to granting increased power to utilize eminent domain, declined to
place an ‘‘articial restriction on the concept of public use’’ that was not war-
ranted by the facts of this case.
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nent domain laws. Florida’s
Senate Bill 134 is only two
lines long and simply expresses
an intent to revise the laws.
West Virginia’s Senate Con-
current Resolution 402 is more
extensive, declaring that the
‘‘legitimate role’’ of govern-
ment is to defend the institution
of private property.41 As a result
it seeks to prevent the utiliza-
tion of eminent domain for the
purpose of private economic
development in the state.
B. Proposals Requiring A
Finding of Blight to Use Emi-
nent Domain
Blight remediation is a long-
standing concept in eminent
domain jurisprudence. Ap-
proved of by the Supreme
Court in Berman v. Parker,42
the use of eminent domain to
redevelop blighted communi-
ties has long been accepted.
Accordingly, much of the re-
cently proposed legislation to
severely limit the use of emi-
nent domain includes this
exception. However, the Su-
preme Court explicitly rejected
the notion that blight is the only
exception to the prohibition on
the use eminent domain for
redevelopment. The Court ex-
plained, ‘‘It is a misreading of
Berman to suggest that the only
public use upheld in that case
was the initial removal of
blight. The public use de-
scribed in Berman extended
beyond that to encompass the
purpose of developing that area
to create conditions that would
prevent a reversion to blight in
the future.’’43 Thus, the subject
of blight has now found its way
into proposed legislation.
Legislators in New York,
California, Massachusetts,
Texas, Wisconsin, Tennessee,
and Alabama have proposed
bills that state a general prohi-
bition on the use of eminent
domain to take private property
for economic development but
explicitly leave open the pos-
sibility for the redevelopment
of blighted property.44 Each bill
oers slightly dierent deni-
tions of the term ‘‘blight.’’
New York Senate Bill 59 de-
41S.C.R. 402, 77th Leg., 4th Spec. Sess. (W. Va. 2005).
42348 U.S. 26 (1954).
43Kelo at 2665, citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1954).
44S.B. 5936, 228th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); A.C.A. 15, 2005-06 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); A.B. 590, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005);
H.D.R. 4634, 184th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005); H.D.R. 4663, 184th
Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005); H.B. 16, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005);
S.B. 26, 79th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex. 2005); A.B. 656, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wis. 2005); S.B. 2413, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005); S.B. 68/
H.B. 14, 2005 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005).
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clares property to be
‘‘blighted’’ if a majority of the
buildings are physically dete-
riorating or economically
unproductive.45 Wisconsin As-
sembly Bill 657 denes
blighted property more gener-
ally as ‘‘any property that, by
reason of abandonment, dilapi-
dation, deterioration,’’ etc. is
‘‘detrimental to the public
health, safety, or welfare.’’46
This approach makes it more
dicult to condemn multiple-
unit dwellings by requiring that
they be abandoned or subject to
higher crime rates then sur-
rounding property.47
An examination of all of the
applicable denitions of blight
in the recently proposed legis-
lation nds various permuta-
tions of two factors: economic
unproductiveness and physical
deterioration leading to a risk
to public health, safety, or
welfare. This is consistent with
the Supreme Court’s sugges-
tion in Hawaii Housing Au-
thority v. Midki that the use of
eminent domain is ‘‘cotermi-
nous with the scope of a sover-
eign’s police powers.’’48
C. Proposals that Gener-
ally Prohibit the Use of Emi-
nent Domain for Economic
Development
This type of proposal, with
or without an exception for
blight, is by far the largest cat-
egory of post-Kelo state
legislation. However, while
these proposals reject the hold-
ing in Kelo v. New London,49
they demonstrate a mispercep-
tion of what the holding actu-
ally means. By attempting to
prohibit the use of eminent do-
main when the sole or primary
purpose of the taking is to ben-
et a private party, these bills
and resolutions mirror Justice
Stevens’ sentiment in the Kelo
opinion that New London
should not be able to ‘‘take
property under the mere pretext
of a public purpose, when its
actual purpose was to bestow a
private benet.’’50 The taking
in the Connecticut case was
nally approved only when this
possibility was excluded. How-
ever, many bills have been pro-
posed to amend existing state
45S.B. 5936, 228th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005).
46A.B. 657, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005).
47See also H.B. 858, 2005 Leg., Basic Sess. (Mo. 2005) for crime-rate driven
blight denition.
48Midki, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
49Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655.
50Id. at 2661.
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eminent domain statutes to
specify that the powers they
grant may not be used except
in very limited circumstances.
Proposals have been intro-
duced in over twenty states that
would eectively prohibit the
use of eminent domain for eco-
nomic development; and it is
clear that this issue is not one
that can be classied from a
‘‘red state or blue state’’
perspective.51
These bills and resolutions
generally have two key parts.
First, they specify which gov-
ernmental or nongovernmental
entities are granted the power
of eminent domain, and then
the specics of that power are
explained. Nearly all of the
proposals amend the aspect of
the existing statute that applies
to how eminent domain may be
used, but Wisconsin Assembly
Bill 457 left that aspect virtu-
ally untouched. Instead, this
bill proposes the elimination of
the condemnation authority of
all nongovernmental entities by
deleting each instance of the
word ‘‘corporation’’ in the ex-
isting eminent domain statute.52
Disagreements over how
eminent domain, and the prop-
erty acquired by it, may be used
are the source of inspiration for
the rest of the bills in this
51S.B. 76, 2005 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005); S.B. 89/S.B. 92, 2005
Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005); A.B. 1162, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2005); H.B. 5062, 2005 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2005); P.B. 6170,
2005 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2005); S.B. 411, 23rd Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Haw. 2005); H.B. 4091, 94th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2005); H.B. 1063,
114th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2005); H.D.R. 4634, 184th Gen. Ct.,
Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005); H.B. 5060, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2005); H.F.
123, 2005 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Minn. 2005); H.F. 132/H.F. 117, 2005 Leg.,
1st Spec. Sess. (Minn. 2005); S.B. 382, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2005);
S.B. 326, 73rd Leg., 2005 Sess. (Nev. 2005); S.B. 5938, 228th Ann. Leg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2005); H.J.R. 10, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005);
S.B. 180, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005); H.B. 3505, 73rd Leg.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005); S.B. 881, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Penn.
2005); H.B. 1835, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Penn. 2005); H.B. 1836, 2005-06
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Penn. 2005); S.B. 88/H.B. 5242, 2005 Gen. Assem., Jan.
Sess. (R.I. 2005); S.B. 2419, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005);
H.B. 2428/S.B. 2424, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005); H.B. 2429/
S.B. 2421, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005); S.B. 2420, 104th
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005); H.B. 15, 79th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex.
2005); S.B. 26, 79th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex. 2005); H.B. 12, 79th Leg., 2nd
Sess. (Tex. 2005); H.B. 65, 79th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex. 2005); H.B. 66, 79th
Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex. 2005); S.B. 184, 2005 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005);
H.B. 256, 2005 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005); A.B. 457, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wis. 2005).
52A.B. 457, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005).
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category. Legislation proposed
in Alabama, Indiana, and Penn-
sylvania list specic types of
development that do not
qualify as permissible public
uses for the utilization of emi-
nent domain.53 For example,
Alabama Senate Bill 89 speci-
es that a ‘‘municipality or
county may not condemn prop-
erty for retail, oce, commer-
cial or residential
development.’’ Bills in Minne-
sota, Ohio, Tennessee, and
Texas set out a blanket prohi-
bition on all condemnations for
the purpose of economic
development.54 In application,
a property seizure for oce
development may also be ben-
ecial for economic develop-
ment, but these designations
are not identical. ‘‘Economic
development’’ does not end
with the land itself, as ‘‘retail
development’’ does, but with
what can be gained from the
land. Proposals in Pennsylva-
nia, Tennessee, and Texas
would prevent the use of emi-
nent domain to increase the tax
base of the community.55 Texas
Senate Bill 26 and Tennessee
House Bill 2428 include the
expansion of the property and
sales tax base as part of ‘‘eco-
nomic development’’ in their
denitions sections.
A number of bills focus on
the action of transfer from one
private entity to another rather
than on the end result of com-
mercial or economic
development. For example,
California Assembly Bill 1162
prohibits the use of eminent
domain ‘‘to acquire owner-
occupied residential real prop-
erty for private use . . . if own-
ership of the property will be
transferred to a private party or
private entity.’’ Bills from
Michigan, Oregon, and Ten-
nessee are much the same.56
Hawaii Senate Bill 411 takes a
dierent approach, providing
that a county may not condemn
private property and subse-
53S.B. 76, 2005 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005); S.B. 89/S.B. 92, 2005
Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005); H.B. 1063, 114th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2005); S.B. 881, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Penn. 2005).
54H.F. 123, 2005 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Minn. 2005); S.B. 180, 126th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005); H.B. 2429/S.B. 2421, 104th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005); H.B. 15, 79th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex. 2005).
55H.B. 1835, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Penn. 2005); H.B. 1836, 2005-06
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Penn. 2005); H.B. 2428/S.B. 2424, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Tenn. 2005); S.B. 26, 79th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex. 2005).
56H.B. 5060, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2005); H.B. 3505, 73rd Leg.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005); S.B. 2419, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 2005).
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quently sell that property ‘‘to a
private entity who expressed an
interest in purchasing that same
property for development pur-
poses or private use before the
condemnation.’’57 Similarly,
Montana Senate Bill 382 would
prevent a city from serving as a
‘‘pass-through entity’’ by ob-
taining property through emi-
nent domain and then selling it
to a private entity within ten
years.
With so much focus on pri-
vate ownership, it is surprising
that there are few bills like Illi-
nois House Bill 4091 that go
into great detail about what
exactly constitutes ‘‘private
ownership or control.’’ This
bill states that the term ‘‘shall
be liberally construed to pre-
vent the use of long-term
leases, options to purchase, and
other mechanisms intended to
defeat the purpose . . . which
is to limit the acquisition of
property by eminent domain
when it is primarily for the ben-
et and use of private
entities.’’58
Enforcement guidelines ap-
pear in other proposals. For
example, Ohio Senate Bill 180
provides consequences for
noncompliance. If a political
subdivision that is eligible to
receive funding from Ohio’s
local government or library
support funds ‘‘appropriates
real property [when the pri-
mary purpose is economic de-
velopment], the political subdi-
vision shall not receive funding
from any of those funds for the
remainder of the biennium in
which the taking occurs.’’59
D. Proposals that Redene
‘‘Public Use’’
Many states have opted for
targeted legislation aimed di-
rectly for the two words at the
heart of this debate: ‘‘public
use.’’60 These bills achieve the
goal of restricting the use of
eminent domain by limiting the
potential breadth of the cate-
gory of what is or is not a pub-
lic use under the Fifth
Amendment.
Tennessee has been particu-
larly focused on this approach,
and the proposals from this
state involve extensive plan-
ning concerns and specicities
not found in the largely similar
bills from other states. Propos-
als from Michigan, Virginia,
57S.B. 411, 23rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2005).
58H.B. 4091, 94th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2005).
59S.B. 180, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).
60Appearing in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment: ‘‘nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.’’ U.S.
Const. amend. V.
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and Tennessee all would pre-
vent the use of eminent domain
to take property from one pri-
vate entity for the primary ben-
et of another private entity.61
Proposals from California,
Georgia, Virginia, and Tennes-
see would also prevent the use
of eminent domain for the pri-
mary purpose of economic de-
velopment or improving tax
revenue.62 However, legislators
from Tennessee also included
procedural guidelines for the
determination of what is to be
considered a ‘‘public use’’63
and a list of examples of per-
missible public uses.64
Tennessee Senate Bill 2413
creates a cause of action for
individuals who own land that
will be taken by eminent do-
main to determine if the taking
is a permissible one. A deter-
mination will then be made as
to whether the proposed taking
is for the primary purpose of
improving tax revenue or for
economic development, with
the provisions of the bill being
construed narrowly in favor of
the property owner. The burden
of proof is placed on the entity
attempting to exercise the
power of eminent domain to
prove that the use is legitimate.
For guidance, Tennessee
Senate Bill 2422 includes a
lengthy list of possible legiti-
mate public uses. This list in-
cludes all of the traditional pub-
licly owned or operated
facilities such as docks,
bridges, reservoirs, roads, tele-
phone and electric lines, cem-
eteries and parks. The list is
extensive but not exhaustive, as
it includes ‘‘any other purpose
which benets the public
welfare.’’ This leaves room for
potential redevelopment that
has private benet as only a
side eect and not a primary
driving force.
E. Proposals that Further
Regulate the Use of Eminent
Domain
Many of the bills that pro-
hibit the use of eminent domain
do so if economic development
61H.B. 5078/S.B. 693, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2005); H.B. 1806, 2005
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2005); S.B. 2413, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn.
2005); H.B. 2426/S.B. 2418, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005);
S.B. 2422, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005).
62A.B. 590, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); S.B. 86, 148th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005); S.B. 1271, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2005);
S.B. 2413, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005); H.B. 2426/S.B. 2418,
104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005); S.B. 2422, 104th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005).
63S.B. 2413, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005).
64S.B. 2422, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005).
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or transfer to a private party is
a primary driving force of the
taking. This wording implies a
planning step to determine
what exactly the primary pur-




tucky, Missouri, and New York
have proposed bills that would
require redevelopment agen-
cies to have specic and com-
prehensive plans for the land to
be taken through eminent
domain.65 New York Assembly
Bill 9043A only requires this
when the primary purpose of
the taking is economic devel-
opment, but California Senate
Bill 53 would require a plan for
any taking of real property by
eminent domain.
Delaware has already signed
a bill into law that requires ad-
vance planning for
redevelopment.66 Senate Bill
217 requires the plan be in
place at least six months in ad-
vance of the institution of con-
demnation proceedings and
that the plan be addressed at a
public hearing and be pub-
lished in a report of the acquir-
ing agency.
One reason to require such a
plan is to avoid the risk of hav-
ing the land sit unused because
of delays in the commence-
ment of development. For this
reason, Missouri House Bill
159 species that if the prop-
erty is not used for its ‘‘specic
intended use’’ within ten years
of the taking, the original prop-
erty owner has the right of rst
refusal to get the land back.
Another reason to require plan-
ning is so the plan may be
evaluated and approved or dis-
approved of. To help local gov-
ernments properly evaluate
proposed developments, Ken-
tucky House Bill 515 would
provide them a ‘‘guidance doc-
ument summarizing state and
federal constitutional law prin-
ciples concerning takings and
provide a framework to assist
state and local government
agencies in evaluating pro-
posed regulatory or administra-
tive actions.’’
Two states have current pro-
posals that would require the
political subdivision in which
the property is located to evalu-
ate and formally approve of
proposed takings. Maryland
House Bill 881 requires that the
65California S.B. 53, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); S.B. 217, 143rd
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2005); H.B. 515, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky.
2005); H.B. 159, 2005 Leg., Basic Sess. (Mo. 2005); A.B. 9043A, 228th Ann.
Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005).
66July 21, 2005.
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legislative body approve of the
action by resolution, while
New York Assembly Bills
8865 and 9015 and Senate Bill
5938 require that the local gov-
ernment vote to approve con-
demnation by a private
developer.
F. Legislation Focused on
Procedural Requirements
Imposing increased proce-
dural requirements on govern-
ments attempting to exercise
this power has the potential to
control its use. Pennsylvania
and New York both have pro-
posed bills that would enact
comprehensive reform of emi-
nent domain procedure in their
state.67 These bills attempt to
‘‘aord homeowners additional
protection if homes are to be
acquired for economic devel-
opment’’6 8 through small
changes in procedures that pre-
viously seemed mundane but
now are a source of great op-
portunity for states who dis-
agree with the Kelo decision.
G. Legislation Addressing
Valuation/Compensation
A number of states have used
the opportunity to focus on the
issues of valuation and just
compensation when property is
condemned. In 1972, Justice
Stewart, writing for the major-
ity in Altamont Farmers v.
United States, identied ‘‘just
compensation’’ as ‘‘what a
willing buyer would pay in
cash to a willing seller.’’69
Courts have long held to this
fair market value standard for
determining what is just com-
pensation in condemnation
proceedings and have been re-
luctant to move beyond it. Un-
fortunately, while this simple
approach is procedurally ef-
cient, it may not necessarily
be good public policy. There
are other factors, such as the
development potential of the
land and the extrinsic value and
relocation costs to the owner,
that may legitimately play a
role in the true value of a par-
ticular piece of property.
While it is dicult to quan-
tify what would truly be ‘‘just
compensation’’ in any given
situation, many lawmakers be-
lieve that fair market valuation
does not adequately capture it.
While most of the recently pro-
posed eminent domain legisla-
tion would decrease the power
67A.B. 9050, 228th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); S.B. 897, 2005-06 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005); H.B. 776, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005).
68A.B. 9050, 228th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005).
69Altamont Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S.
470, 474 (1973), citing United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365
U.S. 624, 633 (1961).
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of governmental agencies to
condemn, others would in-
crease the compensation re-
quired for the takings or impose
procedural requirements on the
establishment of property
value.70 Some of the bills would
provide enhanced compensa-
tion only where property is be-
ing taken for economic devel-
opment purposes but not for
other condemnation purposes.
This approach may present an
Equal Protection problem. In
addition, without a carefully
crafted rationale for compen-
sating beyond fair market
value, state constitutional pro-
visions prohibiting the use of
government funds as a ‘‘gift’’
to benet private individuals
could be violated.
Many of the compensation
related bills concern businesses
that are to be taken through
eminent domain. Maine, Min-
nesota, Pennsylvania and Ne-
vada have bills that require the
condemning agency to com-
pensate the owner of a taken
business for the loss of ‘‘going
concern.’’71 ‘‘Going concern’’
is described by Minnesota
House File 118 as the benet
that ‘‘accrues to a business as a
result of its location, reputation
for dependability, skill or qual-
ity, customer base or any other
circumstances resulting in
probable retention of old or
acquisition of new patronage.’’
Similarly, Wisconsin Assem-
bly Bill 656 proposes to change
the state’s prohibition against
allowing evidence of a busi-
ness’ income in a just compen-
sation proceeding. Property to
be taken by eminent domain
could then be appraised based
on an income approach, which
would be advantageous to busi-
ness owners. Idaho Senate Bill
1152 attempts to provide simi-
lar increased compensation for
businesses72 by requiring that
they receive a xed relocation
70H.B. 117, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2005); H.B. 913, 148th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005); H.B. 1527, 23rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2005);
S.B. 1152, 58th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2005); H.P. 894/L.D. 1297, 122nd
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2005); H.F. 118, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn.
2005); H.F. 2201/S.F. 1693, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005); H.B.
858, 2005 Leg., Basic Sess. (Mo. 2005); S.B. 326, 73rd Leg., 2005 Sess. (Nev.
2005); New Jersey A.B. 4331/S.B. 2815, 2004-05 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2005);
A.B. 9043, 228th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); H.B. 2268, 2005 Leg. Reg.
Sess. (Or. 2005); S.B. 897, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005); A.B. 656,
2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005).
71H.P. 894/L.D. 1297, 122nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2005); H.F. 118,
2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005); S.B. 897, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Pa. 2005); S.B. 326, 73rd Leg., 2005 Sess. (Nev. 2005).
72Also farms.
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payment between $2,500 and
$10,000 depending on previous
net earnings. This payment is
higher than that provided to
displaced individuals and fam-
ilies through the bill.
Property appraisal aects all
participants in a condemnation.
Minnesota Senate File 169373
was designed to provide greater
procedural safeguards to land-
owners who are subject to po-
tential condemnation. It pro-
vides that the condemnor must
fund two separate appraisals
upon the request of the land-
owner and requires that all ap-
praisals be disclosed during
negotiations. Similarly, Oregon
House Bill 2268 requires the
parties to exchange all data
used to determine valuation.
This is echoed in the require-
ment of ‘‘good faith negotia-
tions’’ in Nevada Assembly
Bill 143. To encourage good
faith in valuation negotiations,
Missouri House Bill 858 re-
quires the condemning author-
ity to provide the property
owner with a written summary
of their rights before negotia-
tions begin.
Virginia has a proposal that
would amend the current tak-
ings procedure to include a va-
riety of very specic require-
ments regarding appraisals. It
provides that any decrease in
the fair market value of the
property caused by the likeli-
hood that the property will be
acquired for redevelopment
‘‘shall be disregarded in deter-
mining the compensation for
the property.’’74 Also, the bill
distinguishes between the
amount of compensation re-
quired for the property and the
amount required for damages
to any property remaining to
the landowner. These amounts
must also be separately ap-
praised and reported.
Alabama, Hawaii and Penn-
sylvania each have legislation
proposing that property be val-
ued considering its ‘‘highest
and best use.’’75 Pennsylvania
Senate Bill 897 does this as
part of a factor-based analysis
of ‘‘just compensation.’’ This
bill denes ‘‘just compensa-
tion’’ as ‘‘the dierence be-
tween the fair-market value of
the condemnee’s interest be-
fore the condemnation and the
fair-market value of the prop-
erty after the condemnation.’’
To determine this, a factor
analysis would be employed
that weighs the value of the
73H.F. 2201/S.F. 1693, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005).
74H.B. 1821, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2005).
75H.B. 117, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2005); H.B. 1527, 23rd Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Haw. 2005); S.B. 897, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005).
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present use of the property with
the ‘‘highest and best reason-
ably available use of the prop-
erty’’ along with any ‘‘machin-
ery, equipment, and xtures
forming part of the real estate
taken.’’ Georgia House Bill
913 also takes into account
physical ‘‘features’’ of the
property that aect value. It
requires that compensation be
extended to encompass access
rights to the property and in-
creased trac.
New York Assembly Bills
9043-A and 9050 take a dier-
ent approach in the eort to
provide ‘‘just compensation.’’
They simply require that com-
pensation must be at least
150% or 125%, respectively, of




A number of state legisla-
tures have proposed state con-
stitutional amendments to more
signicantly curtail certain as-
pects of the use of eminent
domain. For example, such ini-
tiatives have been introduced
in Alabama, California, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, and Texas,76 and
representatives from a number
of other states have declared
their intent to propose similar
bills.77 All of these bills gener-
ally prohibit the use of eminent
domain for economic
development.
New York Senate Bill 5961
provides for an amendment that
would read: ‘‘Private property
shall not be taken for use by
private commercial enterprise,
for economic development, or
for any other private use, ex-
cept with the consent of the
owner.’’ Besides common ex-
ceptions for consent and blight,
the proposed constitutional
76H.B. 102, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2005); H.B. 117, 2005 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Ala. 2005); S.C.A. 12, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); S.C.A. 15,
2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); A.C.A. 22, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2005); S.J.R 20, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Fl. 2005); H.R. 87, 148th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005); H.D.R. 4663, 184th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass.
2005); H.J.R. N/H.J.R. P/S.J.R. E, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2005);
S.B. 5961, 228th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); S.J.R. 6, 126th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005); H.J.R. 10, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio
2005); A.C.R. 255/S.C.R. 139, 2004-05 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2005); A.C.R.
256, 2004-05 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2005); S.C.R. 140, 2004-05 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.J. 2005); H.J.R. 11, 79th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex. 2005); S.J.R. 5, 79th
Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex. 2005); S.J.R. 10, 79th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex. 2005); H.J.R.
19, 79th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex. 2005).
77Colorado Representative Al White, Kansas Representative Frank Miller,
Louisiana Representative Joe McPherson, and Oklahoma Representative Mark
Liotta. See http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/states/index.asp.
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amendments, if signed into
law, would foreclose the pos-
sibility of nearly all
redevelopment. California As-
sembly Constitutional Amend-
ment 22 states that takings must
be for a stated public use but
additionally requires a judicial
determination of no reasonable
alternative to condemnation
and full reacquisition rights for
the former owners if the prop-
erty is ever used in a nonpublic
capacity.
I. Legislation (and Execu-
tive Orders) Creating Task
Forces on Eminent Domain
The Kelo decision brought to
the forefront ambiguities in
eminent domain law that have
existed since the drafting of the
Fifth Amendment but had not
come up on a national scale in
decades. A few of the bills and
resolutions introduced would
create task forces or special
commissions to further study
various aspects of eminent do-
main in the state.78 This is by
far the most sensible approach
in determining the best pos-
sible and most appropriate leg-
islative response in the individ-
ual states.
Texas was the rst to estab-
lish such a task force. In Octo-
ber, Governor Rick Perry cer-
emonially signed Senate Bill 7
establishing an interim ten
member committee of legisla-
tors to study the use of eminent
domain for economic
development. However, this
bill also prohibits the taking of
land for economic develop-
ment purposes and to confer a
private benet on a particular
private party. As mentioned in
the introduction, the Missouri
task force, established by gu-
bernatorial executive order, has
already submitted their prelim-
inary report.
Ohio Senate Bill 16779 would
establish a moratorium on the
use of eminent domain in the
state until after the task force
completes its study of eminent
domain and land use planning
in the state. The remainder of
the bills and resolutions in this
category only provide for the
78S.B. 683, 2005 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2005); Delaware H.R. 44/
H.C.R. 38, 143rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2005); S.R. 457 2005-06
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005); H.C.R. 57, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005);
Exec. Order No. 05-15, (Mo. June 28, 2005); S.B. 5946, 228th Ann. Leg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2005); A.B. 9060, 228th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); S.B. 167/
H.B. 331, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005); H.B. 5116, 2005 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2005); H.B. 2428/S.B. 2424, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 2005); H.B. 16/S.B. 41, 79th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex. 2005); S.B. 7, 79th
Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex. 2005).
79See also H.B. 331, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).
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creation of task forces to study
eminent domain law and make
no current substantive changes
to the existing law.80
IV. Conclusion
Legislators and advocates
are rushing to stake a claim to
eminent domain reform for
purposes of telling their con-
stituents that they will be pro-
tected from government con-
demning their home for uses
not believed to be in the public
interest. Although the Kelo de-
cision did not change the law
of eminent domain in the coun-
try, it did provide a platform
for advocates to garner wide-
spread media attention focus-
ing a country looking for dis-
traction from a war overseas to
an issue manipulated to recast
the property rights debate at
home. While certain procedural
protections in the area of con-
demnation may be warranted,
and even long overdue, many
of the legislative proposals rep-
resent a quick overreaction and
have the potential, absent care-
ful study and analysis, to cause
long-term harmful societal
eects. The notion of creating
national and/or statewide study
commissions to more carefully
assess dozens of issues with the
benet of data and widespread
community input is the most
prudent course. Issues includ-
ing, but not limited to, social
equity, compensation for dis-
placed tenants who are not
property owners, and citizen
input are just some of the ad-
ditional issues, not the clear
focus of current proposals, that
warrant attention should there
be the political will for compre-
hensive reform.
80S.B. 683, 2005 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2005); Delaware H.R. 44/
H.C.R. 38, 143rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2005); S.R. 457, 2005-06
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005); H.C.R. 57, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005);
S.B. 5946, 228th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005), A.B. 9060, 228th Ann. Leg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2005); H.B. 5116, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2005); H.B. 2428/
S.B. 2424, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005).
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